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Abstract
Value Based competition in Health Care (VBHC) has become a guiding principle in the quest for high quality health
care for acceptable costs. Current literature lacks substantial ethical evaluation of VBHC.
In this paper we describe how a single-minded focus on VBHC may cause serious infringements upon at least four
medical ethical principles: 1) it tends to neglect patients’ personal values; 2) it ignores the intrinsic value of the
caring act; 3) it disproportionately replaces trust in professionals with accountability, and 4) it undermines solidarity.
Health care needs a next step in VBHC. We suggest a ‘Values-Driven Health Care’ (VDHC) approach that a) takes
patients’ personal values as prescriptive and guiding; b) holds a value account that encompasses health care’s
intrinsic (gift) values; c) is based upon intelligent accountability that supports trust in trustworthy professionals, and
d) encourages patients to raise their voices for the shared good of health care.
Keywords: Value based health care, Ethics, Patient values, Values driven health care, Indicators, Trust, Accountability,
Competition, Intrinsic value
Background
In 2006 the concept of Value Based competition in
Health Care (VBHC) was introduced by Porter, professor
of business strategy at Harvard Business School [1].
During the previous years, health care in the US, and
other Western countries had been heavily criticized for
its high costs and suboptimal quality and safety [2].
With VBHC Porter introduced a twofold strategy to
tackle this. First, health care should be reorganized into
‘value-based’ care pathways around patient groups.
These pathways should no longer be merely focused on
increasing production, while shifting costs to other
providers, but they should strive for the highest value for
patients, i.e. the best possible outcomes, for acceptable
costs [3]. Second, these pathways should compete for the
favour of patients and health care purchasers. Patients
should – in turn – behave more as critical health care
consumers, while purchasers ‘buy’ the best possible
health care for the lowest possible costs.
VBHC’s uptake is immense. During the last decade,
VBHC has been embraced by almost all stakeholders in
most Western health care systems. In the US for
example, there is an extended hospital value-based
purchasing program led by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) [4]. In the UK, the NHS
officially made a shift toward VBHC in 2017, when the
NHS Right Care program officially endorsed the ap-
proach in order to “(...) drive value-based healthcare at
a population level, improve patient outcomes and deliver
significant cost savings” [5]. Recently, ‘The Economist’
assigned Sweden as the worldwide leader in VBHC
adoption [6].
Although it is widely believed that VBHC contributes
to more efficient clinical pathways, a focus on relevant
outcomes, cost awareness, and transparency, evidence of
its effectiveness is still scarcely available [7, 8]. Besides, it
is not self evident that VBHC’s concepts, that are mainly
taken from business strategy, can be straightforwardly
translated to the context of health care. For example, in
1963, health economist Kenneth Arrow already showed
that (free) competition is not the most suitable distribu-
tion mechanism for health care [9]. During the nineties,
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Edmund Pellegrino discussed how the introduction of a
business ethics into health care would corrode important
health care values [10]. And, last but not least, the
definition and the conception of ‘value’ is a completely
different one in (health care) ethics, and philosophy
compared to VBHC’s value definition: ‘outcomes divided
by costs’ [11].
Given VBHC’s considerable influence, the lacking
evidence, and the questions that may be raised regarding
the suitability of a business strategy approach for health
care, it is remarkable that – to our best knowledge – no
substantial ethical reflection upon VBHC has been
published yet. This article’s aim is to fill this gap by eth-
ically reviewing the concept of VBHC. We show that a
single minded focus on some of VBHC’s ideas may cause
serious infringements upon at least four medical ethical
principles. The structure of this article is as follows: for
each of the four critiques we first give some conceptual
grounding, followed by a short vignette that illustrates
the problem. We then analyse the cause of each infringe-
ment, and show what can be done to overcome the
problem. This results into a proposal for a more Values
Driven approach.
Main text
Conceptual basis for the first two critiques
The first two critiques are caused by a rather narrow
conception of ‘value’ in VBHC. Whereas VBHC conceives
of value in a merely economic way (‘clinical outcomes
divided by costs’ [3]), ‘Value Theory’ in philosophy holds a
much broader definition. Its broadest conception of value
covers all parts of moral philosophy, social and political
philosophy, aesthetics, feminist philosophy and the
philosophy of religion. Thus, it encompasses all areas of
philosophy that have some ‘evaluative’ aspect. Economic
value might be part of this, but ‘moral value’ is at least as
important. In its narrowest sense, ‘value theory’ is used for
a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory,
particularly of concern to consequentialists. Here, ‘value
theory’ is roughly synonymous with ‘axiology’, which seeks
to investigate what things are good, how good they are,
and how their goodness is related to one another. In other
words: “what stuffs are good: what is of value?” In the field
of axiology two debates dominate: a) whether or not there
is more than one fundamental value (the monism/plural-
ism debate), and b) whether things are only of instrumen-
tal value (because they help you to attain certain ‘higher’
goals) or whether there are things that are also of intrinsic
value [11].
It is especially on these two questions where VBHC’s
narrow value definition starts to cause problems. First,
we will show that VBHC holds a rather monistic
conception of value, because it perceives certain out-
comes as dominant over others. Second, it will become
clear that VBHC merely encompasses health care’s
instrumental value, and does not take into account the
intrinsic value of the caring act.
VBHC’s monistic account of ‘value’ neglects patients’
pluralistic, personal values in life
Let us take a closer look at the case that is described in
Table 1. While Ms. B’s personal values seem to have
played only an implicit role, VBHC would have judged
the treatment as ‘high value care’: her mood had become
more tempered (improved outcome) and lithium is a
relatively cheap medicine (acceptable costs). The prob-
lem here is that VBHC uses a monistic, and fixed
outcome hierarchy, which is highly standardized for all
patients with a certain disease [3]. For example, the
ICHOM indicator standard Depression and Anxiety
defines “symptoms of depression” as a ‘tier 1 indicator’,
which should preferably be measured with the Patient
Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) [12]. Such a reductionist
value account however, neglects the fact that patients’
personal values in life differ to an important extent.
Traditionally ‘patient values’ are a patient’s unique
preferences, concerns and expectations he or she brings
to a clinical encounter. We believe the patients’ unique
values in life should be prescriptive and action guiding;
not standard sets of indicators. An example of a norma-
tive value theory in healthcare that explicitly takes into
account patients’ unique values in life, is Values Based
Medicine (VBM) [13]. While VBHC is purely outcome-
driven with a focus on the (expected) clinical results
relative to its costs, the focus of VBM is on the perspec-
tive of the particular patient in a given situation. Also,
the broadly endorsed concept of Patient Centered Care
(PCC) makes analogous objections to a monistic concep-
tion of patients’ values. PCC acknowledges the import-
ance of respect for patients as unique living beings, and
the obligation to know them as persons in context of
Table 1 VBHC’s monistic account of ‘value’ neglects patients’
pluralistic, personal values in life
Ms. B, a 64-year old artist, was referred to a psychiatrist, Dr K. She had a
history of occasional but increasingly disruptive episodes of hypomania.
They decide to start on a course of lithium. Their decision was mainly
based on clinical effectiveness, cost, and potential adverse side-effects
respectively. Yet, after a few weeks, that decision turned out to have been
wrong. That is, judged by her values as an artist. She explained that she
did not really have a problem with the lithium, and that her mood had in-
deed been more stable. The problem she experienced was that she could
no longer “see colors”. Colors had lost their emotional intensity, which, for
her as an artist, was a disaster. Had her need to be able to ‘really see’ colors
been more apparent at the time, then the evidence of lithium’s ‘emotional
blunting’ effects would probably have been discussed at that stage. Ms. B.
might still have decided to start on lithium but she would have been aware
of the possibility of this side effect and her doctor would have been aware
of the fact that this was a major concern to her.
Case based on: Fulford, K. W. M., 2008. Values-Based Practice: A New Partner
to Evidence-Based Practice and A First for Psychiatry? Mens Sana
Monographs 6(1):2,3
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their own social worlds, listen to them, inform them,
and to respect them. PCC also stresses that a good out-
come must be defined in terms of what is meaningful
and valuable to the individual patient [14].
A good example of VBM’s, and PCC’s focus on
personal values is the concept of Advance Care Planning
(ACP), which enables “individuals to define goals and
preferences for future medical treatment and care, to
discuss these goals and preferences with family and
healthcare providers, and to record and review these
preferences if appropriate” [15]. In an ACP program in
our hospital, we have recently seen how VBM’s princi-
ples, greatly enrich VBHC’s narrow value conception.
We developed “Pal Pal”, a tablet-based tool for navigat-
ing elderly patients with cancer through the last phase of
their lives [16]. The tool helps patients and their spouses
to discover their goals in life and to clarify personal
values. Pal Pal asks them, for example: “what would you
preferably like to do on an average day?” It then ad-
dresses the question how healthcare could be arranged
in such a way that it helps to accomplish these goals.
For example; if a patient loves gardening, it is discussed
how health care could enable him to continue gardening
for as long as possible. Pal Pal also supports outcome
measurement, using adaptive techniques in order to ob-
tain personalized measures, depending on a patient’s
personal values and goals. This may be a Patient Re-
ported Outcome Measure (PROM), but sometimes other
techniques (interviews or observations) are required.
VBHC’s instrumental perception of health care neglects
health care’s intrinsic ‘gift-value’
Which outcome would result from VBHC measuring the
value (outcomes divided by costs) of the care both
elderly men (in the case in Table 2) receive? Given all
kinds of professional quality standards and the lower op-
portunity costs of professional care, the result might be
that the professional home care is valued higher than
the well-meant informal care that was given by daughter
B, which probably does not meet the professional criteria
and has higher opportunity costs. Although we all
sympathize with the special act of caring by daughter B,
VBHC does not seem to be able to take this into ac-
count. In our view, VBHC infringes upon, and possibly
even corrodes health care’s intrinsic ‘gift value’ [17].
VBHC holds a merely instrumental conception of health
care value, believing that health care only adds value if it
achieves good outcomes for acceptable costs. However,
for some goods – and we believe this also applies to the
‘caring’ part of health care – value is at least partially
constituted by the nonmarket motives for which they
are given. They are valued as tokens of love, admiration,
respect, honor, and so forth. In gift values the relation-
ship between those who are involved in the transaction
is relevant, as well as the altruistic character of the
transaction, which is therefore of intrinsic value. This is
in sharp contrast with the way competitive markets
function. Here, transactions are unimportant in them-
selves, relations are impersonal ones, identities of partic-
ipants are of no importance, and one is free to pursue
one’s personal advantage unrestrained by any consider-
ations for the possible disadvantage of others [18].
Even if VBHC would claim that they are only worried
about the efficient allocation of scarce resources, and
have nothing to say about the intrinsic (gift) value of
health care, the problem still exists, because not paying
attention to the intrinsic value of care giving would
corrode that value, as became clear in the vignette,
where woman B felt that her voluntary gift was reduced
to the cash equivalent of the care she gives to her father.
The field of ‘Care Ethics’ does pay attention to the
intrinsic value of the caring relation [19]. Care ethics
recognizes that below the surface of outcome measure-
ment, there are deeper layers that have to be captured in
order to get a grip on health care quality. It starts with
1. the quality of recognition of a health need (caring
about), followed by 2. the quality of taking care of
(assuming some responsibility for the identified need
and a response, consisting of both the physician’s deliv-
ery of technical care and an empathic or emotional
engagement), 3. the quality of care giving (the direct ac-
tion or actual physical work that is involved in the caring
response), and 4. quality of care-receiving (the way the
object of care will respond to the care it receives [20].
We suggest that a next step in VBHC would be to
incorporate Care Ethics into its conception of ‘value’ in
healthcare. Simply adding an extra performance indica-
tor will not suffice here, as it requires a paradigm shift
in VBHC’s conception of quality (measurement).
Where VBHC uses the paradigm of “erklären” (to
seek management-governed explanations of cause and
effect), care ethics is about “verstehen” (the interpretative
understanding of the meaning of human activities in a
social context). In order to really understand a patient’s
specific context, we suggest VBHC’s current focus on
Table 2 VBHC’s instrumental perception of health care neglects
health care’s intrinsic ‘gift-value’
In a quiet street in a small town, two women live next door to each
other. Both have an elderly father suffering from dementia. Both
neighbours have full-time, well-paid jobs. Unfortunately, their jobs are
currently under pressure because of the care their fathers need. Woman
A) hires 24/7 home care for her father, so she can keep on working, and
he receives the care he needs. Woman B) decides to work part-time for
three days, so she can take care of her father five days a week. Woman
A) is proud as she tells her neighbour that the home care organization
she hired, scores best in several rankings she found on the internet.
Woman B) wonders how the care she gives to her own father would be
valued in such a ranking. Moreover, as soon as she hears the price her
neighbour pays for professional care, she feels as if her voluntary ‘gift’ to
her father is trivialised and reduced to its cash equivalent.
Groenewoud et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:256 Page 3 of 6
measuring indicators will be supplemented and enriched
by other methods, such as interviews, (participative)
observations, shadowing techniques, and narratives in
order to get a taste of the deeper ‘layers’ of intrinsic value
in healthcare. The urgency of this paradigm shift is more
and more acknowledged. In the Netherlands for example,
the Federation of Health Care Insurers (ZN) embraced
narrative medicine as complementary to the normative
measurement of health care quality for the purpose of
value based health care purchasing [21].
Conceptual foundation of the third and fourth critique
Our third and fourth critique on VBHC, have to do with
VBHC’s focus on competition in health care. Doing so,
VBHC combines two of the four basic models for the
distribution of public services, that have been previ-
ously distinguished and described by LSE economist
Julien Le Grand, namely: the ‘targets and performance
management model’ (instead of the ‘trust-model’) and
the ‘choice and competition model’ (instead of the
‘voice-model’) [22]. Le Grand’s four models represent
different views on dealing with the question “what
drives good results of public services and what helps
improvement when results are bad?”
In the trust model, professionals (doctors, nurses and
others) are simply trusted to know what is best for their
users, and to deliver high-quality services without inter-
ference from government or any other source. Oppo-
nents of the trust model believe that on occasion, even
knightly professionals can get it wrong. That some
knights may even in reality be knaves, and that users
might not always be satisfied with the service that they
get. Hence, Le Grand suggests a second model: the
targets and performance management model. This is the
opposite of trust; a version of command and control
where central management sets targets for providers,
rewards them if they succeed in meeting those targets
and penalizes them if they fail. In the voice model users
express their dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) directly to
providers through complaints to higher managers or
elected representatives. In the choice and competition
model, users choose between services offered by compet-
ing providers.
Our third critique has to do with the risk that VBHC
may disproportionately replace trust in professionals
with a culture of mistrust and accountability. The fourth
critique discusses the disadvantages of preferring the
exit-option over the strategy of ‘voice’ if patients would
experience of suboptimal quality of care.
VBHC disproportionately replaces trust in professionals
with accountability
One of the expressions of ‘competition’ in VBHC is the
mechanism of ‘targets and performance management’
[23]. This mechanism leads however to greater
standardization, measurement, auditing and bureaucracy,
as well as tighter organizational control over daily medical
practice (which is illustrated by case 3 in Table 3). This
‘audit culture’ runs the risk of explicitly marginalising
professionalism and professional standards. As a conse-
quence, professional values are under pressure, changing
professional ethics into business ethics. This could lead to
patients being seen as purely profit or loss centres, and
the patient-doctor relationship as subordinate to results
[10]. Doctors experience stress, loss of ownership, and feel
discouraged to develop new initiatives. We do not cherish
a nostalgic and naïve desire to return to the early days of
the medical profession, when people put their unquestion-
ing trust in the knavish character of doctors [24]. We do
however plea for ‘intelligent forms of accountability’, which
may help to put trust in the trustworthy: the competent,
the reliable and the honest [25]. Instead of measuring
skills, and knowledge, the training of professionals will
have to encompass ‘cultivation of virtues and character
traits’. For instance in our hospital, the concept of ‘intelli-
gent trust’ has led to proposals to change the existing
competence profiles for medical students, which used to
focus mainly on knowledge and skills. Our new medicine
curriculum explicitly cultivates virtues as well as character
traits, for example by using ‘role models’ for students and
doctors, which has been claimed before to be an effective
strategy [26, 27].
VBHC may undermine solidarity by favouring exit over
voice
According to VBHC “patients and their families, (…)
empowered with better information, would accept more
responsibility for their health care choices. These choices
have to be based on excellent results, not on convenience
or amenities. The closest provider is not necessarily the
best provider” [28].
We think however that embracing the mechanism of
choice as VBHC does, has three important disadvan-
tages, all pointing towards an infringement upon the
moral concept of ‘solidarity’. This infringement may
Table 3 VBHC disproportionately replaces trust in professionals
with accountability
In a large hospital in London the board of directors organized a
meeting with the Obstetrics and Gynaecology staff to discuss the
newest set of outcome indicators for mother and child care. The
implementation of the process of measuring, reporting, feedback, and
improvement had not been a success thus far. As a result, the hospital
had not been able to deliver its data to the NHS, who now gave them
an ultimatum. One of the midwifes takes the floor, and she sounds
rather agitated as she declares: “Last week it took me longer to do the
paperwork than to deliver the baby. That’s not what a midwife is there for”.
Based on: O’Neill, O., 2013. What we don’t understand about trust. TED Talk:
https://www.ted.com/talks/onora_o_neill_what_we_don_t_understand_about_
trust?language=nl . Accessed March 20, 2019
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gradually increase, depending on how one conceives of
‘solidarity’. In Anglo-Saxon countries, solidarity it is
often used synonymously with the concept of ‘justice’
[29]. Here, solidarity means: equal freedom and equal
opportunities for all persons in a society. Inequalities are
acceptable as long as they work out for the good of the
least well off. The first problem with VBHC’s idea of
‘voting with your feet’, based on information about
health care quality, is that only well-educated people are
able to do so (see also case 4 in Table 4). Lower
educated people do not have equal opportunities, so to
say, to end up in a high quality hospital. One could
argue of course, that if all hospitals start improving their
quality, the average quality will rise, and also the less
well-off will be better off; which would indicate a fulfill-
ment of the egalitarian criterion of justice [30]. However,
to our knowledge there is no empirical prove for this
expectation.
The second and third infringement of the moral
concept of ‘solidarity’ become more clear if we follow
the definition of solidarity, that was introduced by Prain-
sack and Buyx, conceiving of solidarity as: “shared prac-
tices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’
(financial, social, emotional,or otherwise) to assist others”
[31]. Encouraging patients to vote with their feet, as
VBHC does, may incentivize (middle and higher clas-
ses) patients to escape the system, turning instead to
private providers that are outside the reach of the less
fortunate. Also, from a standpoint of the republican
conception of citizenship, this is dangerous. This
inequality does not simply prevent the poor from
sharing in the fruits of consumption and choosing
their ends for themselves; it also leads rich and poor
to live increasingly separate lives [32].
Third, exit’ might even have degrading effects on
health care’s ‘shared value’ [9]. This is the intrinsic value
of those parts of society whose ‘being good’ consists – at
least partly – in the fact that they are understood to be
held in common. Shared values are dependent on people
collectively enjoying them. We are all familiar with this
from for example cultural heritage or National Parks,
but why should we not cherish our health care systems
in the same way? Shared enjoyment of health care also
encompasses a shared responsibility for the improve-
ment of the good, whenever a member of the group
experiences problems or dissatisfaction in using it.
Where VBHC’s focus on choice and exit potentially
degrades the value of healthcare, we suggest ‘voice’ as a
completely different corrective, calling on people’s re-
sponsibility to defend the shared good of healthcare.
‘Voice’, in this sense, may come in many different forms.
Most Western countries have institutionalized patient
representation at both a meso level (e.g. hospital) and a
macro level (e.g. benefit basket). Much more radical is
the phenomenon of “community owned (primary) health
care”, which is quite common in Australia, where civil-
ians take responsibility to organize and improve health
care, and (re)distribute the resources available [33].
Conclusion
We have seen how VBHC may infringe upon at least
four important values or principles in health care.
VBHC’s rather narrow conception of value tends to neg-
lect patients’ personal and contextual values of life, and
it does not encompass the intrinsic value of the caring
act. Besides, VBHC’s focus on target and performance
managements (the business of outcome measurement),
and on choice and exit (voting with your feet) may en-
danger the concepts of ‘trust in professionals’ respect-
ively ‘solidarity’. Health care desperately needs a next
step in VBHC. We believe this next step should be
‘Values-Driven Health Care’. In this article we have
shown how this alternative approach would be of great
complementary value to VBHC in the way it 1) takes pa-
tients’ personal values as prescriptive and guiding; 2)
holds a value account that encompasses health care’s in-
trinsic (gift) values; 3) is based upon intelligent account-
ability that supports trust in the trustworthy, and 4)
encourages patients to raise their voices for the shared
good of health care.
Abbreviations
ACP: Advance care planning; CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services; PCC: Patient Centred Care; PROM: Patient Reported Outcome
Measure; VBHC: Value based health care; VBM: Values based medicine;
VDHC: Values Driven Health Care
Acknowledgements
Not applicable.
Funding
No funding was received.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Table 4 VBHC may undermine solidarity by favouring exit over
voice
Mrs. Z., a wealthy widow, visits an orthopaedist in her local, public
hospital. On her first appointment at the outpatient ward, there appears
to be ‘no love lost’ between her and her doctor, to put it mildly. Mrs. Z.
leaves the hospital feeling very offended and insulted. That very
evening she visits a website where patients can post reviews of their
experiences with doctors. She writes a critical review, and she also uses
the ‘find your doctor’ function to choose a different orthopaedist; this
time in a private clinic.
One week later, Mrs. Z. tells her story to her brother in law, Mr. J., who
is not that well-established. He was not even aware of the fact that
patients are ‘allowed’ to change doctors. Let alone that he knew the
place on the internet where comparisons between health care providers
can be made. He wonders what will happen if all people like Mrs. Z. will
‘leave the public system’. Deep in his heart, it makes him feel a second-
rate civilian, who is left with inferior health care facilities.
Groenewoud et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:256 Page 5 of 6
Authors’ contributions
ASG was the main author and initiator of the article; GPW was co-author,
re-wrote the article and helped selecting cases; JAMK was co-author and
helped improving the manuscript conceptually. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Received: 25 April 2018 Accepted: 9 April 2019
References
1. Porter ME, Teisberg EO. Redefining health care: creating value-based
competition on results. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press; 2006.
2. Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Quality of Health Care in
America. Crossing the quality chasm: a new health system for the 21st
century. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2001. p. 337.
3. Porter ME. What is value in health care? N Engl J Med. 2010;363(26):2477–81.
4. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017. Hospital value-based
purchasing. https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_
Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf Accessed 22 Oct 2018.
5. NHS England, 2017. NHS right care and the shift to value-based health care.
Board paper. PB.09.02.2017/06. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/board-papers-090217-item-6-nhs-rightcare.pdf
Accessed 22 Oct 2018.
6. The Economist, 2016. Value-based healthcare: A global assessment Country
snapshot from The Economist Intelligence Unit. http://vbhcglobalassessment.
eiu.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2016/09/Sweden.pdf
Accessed 22 Oct 2018.
7. Porter ME. Value-based health care delivery. Ann Surg. 2008;248(4):503–9.
8. Larsson S, Lawyer P. Improving health care value - the case for disease
registries: The Boston Consulting Group; 2011.
9. Arrow KJ. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical-care. Am Econ
Rev. 1963;53(5):941–73.
10. Pellegrino ED. The commodification of medical and health care: the moral
consequences of a paradigm shift from a professional to a market ethic. J
Med Philos. 1999;24(3):243–66.
11. Schroeder M. Value Theory. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford: Stanford University; 2012.
12. ICHOM, 2017. http://www.ichom.org/medical-conditions/depression-
anxiety/. Accessed 13 Apr 2018.
13. Fulford KWM. Values-based practice: a new partner to evidence-based
practice and a first for psychiatry? Mens Sana Monographs. 2008;6(1):10–21.
14. Epstein RM, Street RL Jr. The values and value of patient-centered care. Ann
Fam Med. 2011;9(2):100–3.
15. Rietjens JAC, Sudore RL, Connolly M, van Delden JJ, Drickamer PMA, Droger
M, et al. Definition and recommendations for advance care planning: an
international consensus supported by the European Association for
Palliative Care. Lancet Oncol. 2017;18(9):e543–51.
16. Van Gurp J., Ebenau A., Van Leeuwen E., Van der Burg S, Hasselaar J., 2015.
Life Values of Older Advanced Cancer Patients (70+). A Qualitative Study to
Improve Care in the Last Phase of Life. Presentation at the 2015 EAPC
conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. Abstract number: FC10.6. Abstract
type: Oral.
17. Anderson E. The ethical limitations of the market. Econ Philos. 1990;(6):179–205.
18. Kaveny MC. Commodifying the polyvalent good of health care. J Med
Philos. 1999;24(3):207–23.
19. Tronto JC. Moral boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care. New
York; London: Routledge; 1993.
20. Ibid. p. 106-108.
21. ZN, 2018. Science shares insights with insurers for the sake of health care
purchasing in nursing homes. (in Dutch). https://www.zn.nl/338067458/
Nieuwsbericht?newsitemid=3448209408 Accessed 6 Nov 2018.
22. Le Grand, J. (2007). The other invisible hand : delivering public services
through choice and competition. Princeton; Oxford, Princeton University Press.
23. Le Grand J. The Politics of Choice and Competition in Public Services. Polit
Q. 2007;78(2):207–13.
24. Le G. Knights, knaves or pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy. Jnl Soc
Pol. 1997;26(2):149–69.
25. O'Neill O. Accountability, trust and informed consent in medical practice
and research. Clin Med. 2004;4(3):269–76.
26. Kenny NP, Mann KV, MacLeod H. Role Modeling in Physicians’ Professional
Formation: Reconsidering an Essential but Untapped Educational Strategy.
Academic Med. 2003;78(12):1203–10.
27. Cruess SR, Cruess RL, Steinert Y. Role modelling—making the most of a
powerful teaching strategy. BMJ. 2008;336:718–21.
28. Porter ME, Teisberg EO. Redefining health care: creating value-based
competition on results. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press; 2006.
(295, 301)
29. Houtepen R, Ter Meulen R. The Expectations of Solidarity: Matters of Justice,
Responsibiility and Identity in the Reconstruction of the Health Care System.
Health Care Anal. 2000;8:355–79.
30. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 11th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1989.
(1972)
31. Prainsack B, Buyx A. Solidarity in contemporary Bioethics. Towards a new
approach. Bioethics. 2012;26(7):343–50.
32. Sandel MJ. What money can't buy: the Moral Limits of Markets. The Tanner
lectures on human values. Oxford: Brasenose College; 1998.
33. COPHE Australia, 2017. http://www.cophe.com/. Accessed 13 Apr 2018.
Groenewoud et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:256 Page 6 of 6
